The National Ticketing Solution - a looming debacle or some minor hiccups?

When then Transport Minister, Hon. Michael Wood, announced that a contract had been signed between the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) and Cubic for a National Ticketing Solution (NTS) for New Zealand I had two reactions.

The first was some optimism that having a centralised approach might accelerate enabling all of the cities and towns with urban public transport systems finally have contactless bank-issued card payment for all bus services (and the handful of rail and ferry services). Given cities from London to Sydney and Brisbane had all implemented such systems in the past decade and a half, there is no doubt that there should be value in enabling the public to just use a contactless credit card to pay to ride a bus. It should remove a barrier to people who don’t use such services, by enabling the cheapest fare to be offered to virtually everyone, as well as a side benefit of enabling visitors to each city to use their services. 

However, I also had some doubts for three reasons:

· NZTA has no experience in operating public transport systems at all, let alone procuring ticketing systems for them. It’s primary role is as a funder of Regional Councils and Unitary Authorities to themselves fund and contract such services.

· NZTA wont be collecting any of the revenue, so its incentives to ensure the contract is delivered on time and to budget are poorer than that of Regional Councils, let alone public transport operators themselves.

· The record internationally of governments contracting systems suppliers for ticketing is very mixed. Witness Melbourne’s Myki system debacle which saw the project run well over time and budget.

Unless central government plans on setting fares and collecting fares then remitting them to councils, then the reasons for centralising this project are weak.  I doubt the last government intended to do that and certainly this one shows no sign of doing so. 

I also recall 20 years ago when I was in the UK, the UK Government then was developing an integrated ticketing system which came to nothing, called ITSO. It was led by the Department for Transport and achieved next to nothing.  That ought to have been a warning for governments globally of the folly of pursuing such projects. Bearing in mind Melbourne's Myki contract was A$1.5 billion over ten years and did NOT include contactless payment with bank issued cards. 

The timeline of the NTS is telling because its origins go back to 2009 (PDF), but all started to fall apart in 2015 when local authorities couldn’t agree on an approach with NZTA. In 2018 it all changed when the NZTA, under a new Government and Minister, tool charge of the project and was directed to pay for it. 

NZTA has a lot to do. It is a road controlling authority, it is a land transport system funder and a regulator of drivers, vehicles and operators. Adding the procurement of a public transport ticketing system to this complicated and in some cases conflicting sets of demands should have given pause for thought, but the tendency of the Ardern Government was one of centralisation. The creation of Te Whatu Ora as a national health authority to replace District Health Boards, the creation of Te Pukenga to replace multiple polytechs and even the proposed Three Waters reforms to consolidate water providers all indicate a philosophical preference for centralised funding, control and decision-making. The NTS mirrors that. Whilst the National-led Coalition Government since 2023 has been able to unwind some of those other centralising reforms, the contract with Cubic is another story. 

The press release behind the NTS said:

“The local authorities saw the benefits that the NTS can provide to the decarbonisation and economic development of their regions. 

“Through improved access and increased patronage of public transport, roads will become less congested, safer and we will reduce our emissions,” Michael Wood said.

The National Ticketing Solution will be rolled out in a stage process across the different public transport authorities, starting with Environment Canterbury in 2024.

Naturally it was welcomed by local authorities which could wash their hands of much of the cost and responsibility for the ticketing solution, although they obviously would have to work with NZTA to ensure their contracted operators implemented it. The claims around increased patronage and consequently less congestion and lower emissions are optimistic, but the real optimism was that it would start being rolled out in 2024.

The current Government was stuck with the contract, so then Transport Minister, Hon. Simeon Brown was optimistically hoping the project would deliver as promised. The cost of the project was in December 2024 forecast to be $1.33 billion, which includes the cost of operating it for a decade. That cost comprises just over $527m to design and build the system and another $800 to operate the system for ten years. So it is $80m a year to run a NTS.

Note that in parallel, Auckland Transport pursued its own project to implement contactless ticketing, apparently at a cost of $23m, which it successfully implemented in 2024. It is being presented as a first stage in the NTS, as it will integrate, but it is a stark difference from $1.33 billion when you consider that the majority of public transport rides in the country are in Auckland.

Timaru was effectively meant to be the soft launch in December 2024. Timaru, it is worth remembering, Timaru has a daily average patronage of around 730 people.

The latest report from RNZ indicates that the current Transport Minister, Hon. Chris Bishop is concerned that the advice from NZTA earlier in the year was “overly optimistic”. He should be concerned, as it looks like the classic large government IT project going wrong. The RNZ report notes Cubic’s credit rating drop, which should not be a major issue, as the main issues are not from that side.

A report from RNZ a month ago indicated two main problems which are a result of centralising a project without centralising the project objectives and governance. These problems are:

· Councils demanding that their own bespoke concessions be implemented in a single system, adding costs and delays;

· The project governance group operating slowly largely because it operates on consensus.

What this smacks of is a project that didn’t adequately define it scope and policy position from the start, and which doesn’t have NZTA taking full control (no doubt because it doesn’t have as much of a stake in the system as the councils and public transport operators). 

The big problem at the moment is delays in implementation, but project delays inevitably raise costs to the supplier, and although NZTA could and should be strict as to what it pays for the project, far too often government agencies are seen by suppliers as “soft” on contractors largely because government is seen as having a, more or less, unlimited capacity to absorb cost escalation. Given that the delays are due to poor governance of the councils and their fare policy, and the project governance overall, it may only be a matter of time before the supplier demands more money. 

It's all too late now, but what should have happened is that NZTA, as part of its previous three-year National Land Transport Programme should have signalled to all Regional Councils and Unitary Authorities that subsidies for public transport would be conditional on them all implementing contactless payment by bank-issued cards, and leave it to them to implement it either individually or collectively (or more than likely, some mix of both). It almost certainly doesn’t matter if it happens in Timaru or Whanganui, but it does matter if it happens in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. The funding function of NZTA should have been able to incentivise a change in the delivery of public transport, transferring risk and responsibility to those better placed to take it on (or at least better incentivised). If there are questions about the competence of Greater Wellington Regional Council, Environment Canterbury et al to do that then these should be raised, but I’m unsure if there are. 

Unfortunately, NZTA had responsibility for a project that combines customer service, engagement, digital systems and leadership, and taxpayers are taking on a risk that is being exacerbated by the behaviour of those who are meant to benefit from it. 

Hopefully the whole project can get “back on track” and Motu Move (of course a new brand for the product was quickly produced, because that’s not difficult) can be a success financially and operationally. After all, NZTA doesn’t buy buses centrally for bus operators to use, nor does it buy trains for Kiwirail or Auckland Transport. The reasons for this are fairly clear. 

I expect Minister Bishop will ensure that NZTA and councils are given enough direction to keep this project within budget, and for Cubic not to be let off the hook. Cubic should have known clearly the risks of the project when it signed the contract, so should bear such costs.  NZTA should be strict on funding of public 

It doesn’t end when it is rolled out, because Cubic will be running it for a decade. Who knows what might happen to payment system in that time? Will it be flexible enough to cope with changes? Who knows, but you know who will be paying if it goes wrong. If it stays within budget then there is a lot of credit to be had for managing that contract. By contrast if this project becomes a disaster, it will not bode well for NZTA.

Wellington and the "long tunnel"

Early LGWM "Long Tunnel" option

I don't tend to do parochial posts on here, but this has my interest, not least because I grew up in the eastern suburbs of Wellington, went to school for some years via Mt Victoria Tunnel, and now once again, live in the eastern suburbs of Wellington after a 20 year absence. I've followed this with interest because for all of my life Mt. Victoria Tunnel has been seen as "inadequate", and it is. This post attempts to explore what might be done, and why...

The raising of the "long tunnel" initially made public under Let's Get Wellington Moving, and revived under the National-led Government since the 2023 General Election is all about a fundamental land transport problem in Wellington that has been a weeping sore since the early 1980s - what should the bypass of Wellington's downtown be?

The problem harks back to three major strategic infrastructure decisions from many years ago:

• Rongotai as the site for Wellington's primary airport (replacing Paraparaumu and Evan's Bay (the latter for flying boats!)
• The Foothills Motorway (in favour of the waterfront motorway proposal). 
• Location of Wellington's primary airport at Rongotai.

What this all means is that two key regional facilities are separated from the Hutt Valley, Porirua and Kapiti, as well as Wellington's western and northern suburbs, by central Wellington.  The key traffic problem is that the motorway was never finished to a second Mt Victoria Tunnel, as was originally intended.

None of this was a problem for the first few years after the motorway was built, because until 1984 it was not connected to State Highway 1, but after the Ngauranga Interchange was opened (relieving the Hutt Road south of Ngauranga and the waterfront quays), it was clear that having through traffic snake through Te Aro was unsatisfactory. 

There are two main arterial routes from the north through Wellington, both of which funnel traffic from the motorway (SH1 and SH2), the Hutt Road (from the northern suburbs of Ngaio and Khandallah mostly), the western suburbs via secondary arterials such as Glenmore Street and Aro Street, towards the south and the west.  

These images below depict the volumes of traffic in the AM and PM peak respectively, in 2013 along the main arterial routes, highlighting the urban motorway and SH1 (Vivian Street eastbound and Karo Drive westbound), and along the waterfront route along the Quays, Wakefield and Cable Streets, then Kent and Cambridge Terraces.

AM peak traffic Wellington 2013

 

PM peak traffic Wellington 2013

Between 25 and 30% of traffic exiting and entering the motorway at the Terrace Tunnel is coming from or heading to the Mt Victoria Tunnel, so is using the streets in Te Aro to bypass the downtown area. Another 5-25% of traffic at peak times each is heading onto or coming from Taranaki Street and Adelaide Road south of SH1, indicating that the vast majority of Terrace Tunnel traffic is travelling to and from the southern and eastern suburbs, not Te Aro and the CBD. 

For Mt Victoria Tunnel 30-40% of traffic at peak times is heading to or from the Terrace Tunnel, noting its importance for providing access to the wider region to and from the airport. 

Of course that route as a whole has multiple bottlenecks, particularly southbound with the Terrace Tunnel having only one-lane.  Both the Terrace Tunnel and Mt Victoria Tunnel as bottlenecks, result in diversion onto other routes, notably the waterfront as seen below.

Southbound, around 25-30% of traffic on Aotea Quay at peak times is actually heading for either Mt Victoria Tunnel, Adelaide Road or Oriental Parade, it seems likely another few percent is heading towards Taranaki Street as well. Northbound the figure is 15-20% at peak, likely because there are fewer delays westbound through Te Aro as Karo Drive and the Terrace Tunnel both have one more lane (and two fewer traffic signal delays) than the eastbound direction along Vivian Street.  The 5-15% of traffic heading for Oriental Parade will be in part for leisure and accessing Roseneath, but is also likely to include substantial traffic going "around the bays" to the airport, notwithstanding that it is around a third longer in distance than using Mt Victoria Tunnel. 

In other words, the waterfront route is a backup, and carries between 15 and 30% more traffic than it should because there isn't a reliable bypass to the city. This doesn't just add to congestion along that route, but adds to the cost and hindrance of bringing the city more closely to its harbour. If that proportion of traffic were able to be removed, then there would be scope to convert a lane each way for use for bus rapid transit, but to do so with current traffic volumes would exacerbate congestion elsewhere and add to delays, in the absence of time-of-use road pricing (more on that later).

Weekday traffic between Aotea Quay, Mt Victoria Tunnel, Adelaide Road and Oriental Parade

Defining the problem

Although it would be technically feasible to implement time-of-use road pricing on central Wellington at peak times to reduce traffic entering the central city, it is unlikely to be politically feasible to apply this to through traffic not terminating there, at least as a first step.  While motorists are likely to accept road pricing at peak times entering central Wellington, where there are bus and rail options from most parts of the region, such options are not feasible for traffic heading from the Hutt/Porirua towards the airport and hospital, so an inner city cordon, for example, would need to exclude at the very least, SH1 across Te Aro and roads to its south, and possibly also through traffic along the waterfront. 

That leaves the inadequacies of the current SH1 corridor very clear:

• Terrace Tunnel bottleneck. One south-bound lane, with it being not technically feasible or safe to implement tidal flow operations (this has been previously investigated).
• Vivian Street bottleneck. Besides being only two-lanes eastbound, the presence of SH1 along Vivian Street adds to the blight in that part of Te Aro, as a major highway route severs Willis, Victoria, Cuba, Taranaki and Tory Streets. The congestion and community severance are not going to be resolved by doing nothing. Karo Drive adds to this westbound, but east of Taranaki Street the Arras Tunnel provides relief.
• Basin Reserve: With major flows from the south to the east and from the east to the west, as well as smaller north-south flows, this roundabout's asymmetric traffic flows have been a bottleneck for decades.
• Mt Victoria Tunnel and approaches from the east: Peak and inter peak, Mt Victoria Tunnel is a bottleneck that backs up to Vivian Street at certain times from the west and north, and backs up along Cobham Drive from the airport eastbound.

The attractiveness of the long tunnel was that it would provide a means for traffic from the east, particularly the airport and Miramar Peninsula, but also Kilbirnie, Lyall Bay and part of Newtown, to access the motorway easily. However, its main limitation (notwithstanding the likely cost) is that it would not provide a solution for through traffic to the southern suburbs, like most of Newtown and Island Bay and notably the hospital. The existing road layouts in Te Aro would have to continue, by and large, to service those areas, unless an expensive interchange were built somewhere in Newtown, which itself would add enormously to the cost of the project.

The main benefit of the long tunnel was that it could be built with minimal disruption, but that is about it...

How Wellington got here.

It was not always going to be that way. The De Leuw Cather report that saw the Foothills Motorway approved (which became the Wellington Urban Motorway) proposed the motorway be completed to a second Mt Victoria Tunnel, to the north of the current tunnel.  By and large the motorway that was built to the Hawkestone Street/Tinakori Road off/on ramps resembled the original plan (albeit the flyovers to and from Ngaio Gorge were never built, but the stubs for them remain).  However, budget cuts in the early 1970s saw only half of the motorway built south of there, which is why it suddenly goes from three lanes each way to one plus two.  Only one Terrace Tunnel was built, where there was meant to be two, and it terminated at Ghuznee Street southbound and Vivian Street.

The original urban motorway would have seen a second Mt. Victoria Tunnel, but would have decimated the Basin Reserve.  Te Aro would truly have had a brutalist motorway severing the area, and the cricket ground would have been gone, but that concept was gone within a decade.

Original De Leuw Cather Wellington urban motorway Basin Reserve interchange concept.

In 1972, the Wellington City District Scheme had this option as the revised plan which from the bottom of the image would have seen two-lane each way (extended from two Terrace Tunnels, with a lane gained/lost at the Vivian Street/Ghuznee St one way pair) under Willis and Victoria Streets (Victoria Street had not been extended then), under Cuba Street as well with on and off-ramps at Taranaki Street and Tory/Tasman Street. Curiously the Basin Reserve would have remained two way along Dufferin St , with a second Mt Victoria Tunnel, and the motorway skirting the Basin Reserve.

1972 Wellington Urban Motorway Te Aro extension with duplicate Terrace and Mt Victoria Tunnels

By the 1980s this had been much more simplified, but with a bridge over Taranaki Street that was seen as too intrusive

1980 Wellington Urban Motorway Arterial Extension concept with elevation over Taranaki St

Although it was placed under Taranaki Street that didn't exactly help public acceptability with this sort of rendering.

1991 Wellington Urban Motorway trenched (not covered) under Taranaki St

So, the entire section from Willis Street to the Basin Reserve was to be put into a cut and cover tunnel, called Tunnellink. Going east there would be one on-ramp at Victoria Street and another from Kent Terrace to the Mt Victoria Tunnel, with an off-ramp to Cambridge and Kent Terrace for southbound traffic to Newtown. Going west, one onramp from the Basin Reserve and an offramp at Victoria Street were all, as the road was primarily designed for through traffic.

1994 Tunnellink concept - cut and cover tunnel from Vivian Street to Sussex Street with two-way Basin Bridge to single Mt Victoria Tunnel

This did not proceed, as the funding constraints in the 1990s saw the newly named "Wellington Inner City Bypass" built in 2007, essentially widening and extending Arthur Street west to Willis Street, so that the northbound on-ramp could be relocated a block south, and Vivian Street became the southbound off-ramp as a one-way pair. The Arras Tunnel, built solely to enable the War Memorial Park, provided a wider route with the removal of Buckle Street and the Tory Street westbound intersection.

The Inner City Bypass was meant to be a medium-term, second stage of a three stage programme to relieve congestion between the motorway and Mt. Victoria Tunnel (Tunnellink meaning to the third). The first stage was a simple one-way system on existing streets, and the third-stage was meant to be a cut and cover tunnel across Te Aro to the Basin Reserve.  The second stage (the status quo) was expected to be adequate for ten years at the most, noting that from the early 1990s Wellington has had a strategy of constraining growth in traffic towards the central city.

Constraining traffic

In the early 1990s, what was then called the "arterial extension" to the Wellington Urban Motorway required Ministerial approval, and the then Minister, Rob Storey, a National MP from a rural electorate, required that action be taken to constrain growth of traffic because of concerns of induced demand.  The business case for the project estimated an annual traffic growth factor of 2%. The response was the introduction of the Coupon Parking Scheme, on unmetered car parks close to central Wellington, which Wellington City Council estimated would constrain traffic growth to 0.5% (along with introduction of limits to car parks for all new developments and abolition of the minimum car park requirement).  At the time, Transit New Zealand as the land transport funding agency and state highway manager, recognised this, but the impact on the business case for the project was to knock it back.  In effect, demand management delayed the need for the project.

Tunnellink and the three stages

In the 1990s, there was some controversy over the proposed motorway extension, although there was always a clear majority of city councillors in favour of the project.  Yet the key issue was funding at a time when Government only allowed enough funding to be made available for land transport projects with a benefit/cost ratio of at least 5:1 (lowered to 4:1 in 1998 onwards), for a project that, at the time, had a BCR of 2.6 (although an optimistic scenario saw it raised to 3.2). 

With the change in government in 1999, there was quite a fight to be had as the Clark Government relied on the Greens for confidence and supply, and also agreed to consult the Greens on transport policy. The Greens demanded that the Inner City Bypass be stopped. At the time, the legislation did not allow the Minister of Transport to direct the then, independent funding agency, Transfund New Zealand, to approve or block any projects. In truth, the Clark Government was in favour of the project, and it received approval, although opponents used every legal avenue to delay it, so that it took over a decade from the initial approval of the concept for it to finally get built.

Of course by that time Transit New Zealand, as the state highway manager, had abandoned hope that any additional project would ever get approved across Te Aro, so had shelved the Tunnellink idea and refocused on what would be needed next - and that was the Basin Reserve.

That became the next problem,

Basin Reserve

The Inner City Bypass made a useful difference to traffic flow across the city. Particularly westbound, having shifted traffic a couple of blocks south, and with three lanes, queues towards the Basin Reserve were eased, and delays reduced.  Eastbound, Vivian Street flowed more efficiently as a single one way route than the dog-legged route via Ghuznee Street, but the Terrace Tunnel remained a major bottleneck. By the 2010s, although there were now budget surpluses and governments of both hues committing to more funding for roads, a second Terrace Tunnel still seemed some years away.  The focus shifted to the Basin Reserve, as it would (and still does) back traffic up in both directions.  As the Basin is effectively a major intersection with heavy traffic flows east-west and lesser flows north-south, the case for some grade-separation of those flows has always existed.  

From there came the Ngauranga to Airport study and the Basin Bridge project. The Basin Bridge started as a project to take westbound traffic out of circulating around the Basin Reserve from Mt Victoria Tunnel, and towards Buckle Street. Indeed, the 2012 depiction essentially envisaged it feeding the Arras Tunnel.  The effect of this would have been to significantly change the traffic light phasing around the Basin Reserve to ease flows to and from Adelaide Road, but the backlash, even though the bridge was essentially clear of the Basin (and designed with a 50 km/h limit) was considerable from Mt Victoria Residents. This was also fuelled by many who opposed the Inner City Bypass, seeing this as just another "motorway" to oppose.

2012 one-way Basin Bridge concept to existing Mt Victoria Tunnel only

Perhaps the biggest limitation of this proposal was that it offered little scope to support relocating State Highway 1 south away from Vivian Street to enable two-way traffic.  It solved "half" of the problem and offered no real vision for what a decent bypass of Wellington should look like and how it should function. Hence it would also not satisfactorily support a second Mt Victoria Tunnel, as that tunnel would be constrained by the capacity of Kent Terrace and Vivian Street.  The Basin Bridge would have been short-sighted.

2012 one-way Basin Bridge concept to existing Mt Victoria Tunnel only from west

The history behind the Basin Bridge and the Environment Court rejecting it, largely due to objections of local residents is the embryo of Let's Get Wellington Moving.  As that emerged, in part to try to find a way forward, another concept came up, enabling two-way traffic to bypass the Basin.

This concept enabled a future of a trenched bypass through Te Aro feeding onto a bridge towards a second Mt Victoria Tunnel, with an at grade route close to the Basin, with Sussex Street widened and built over the new road towards a widened Cambridge Terrace.  This would mean two way traffic from Adelaide Road circulating over Sussex Street abandoning the Basin roundabout, although it was not perfect. It offered no access from Mt Victoria Tunnel to Cambridge Terrace with only a rudimentary ramp for access to the schools at the Basin, although that could easily be fixed by making the Dufferin Street ramp larger and retaining "around the Basin access" to Sussex St.  You can see the dotted line for an eastbound cut and cover tunnel  from the motorway with a ramp to Cambridge Tce and continuing to Mt Victoria Tunnel, but again there remains a flaw.  Access from THAT tunnel to Adelaide Road doesn't exist. Without direct access from the bypass to Adelaide Road, the route misses a key connection, so this is not a solution.

2018 alternative Basin Bridge concept two way

So a whole host of options emerged, as Let's Get Wellington Moving saw its objectives amended, largely reducing the value placed on reducing traffic congestion, and more focused on modal shift and encouraging active modes and public transport.  The options illustrated below demonstrated this as none would support moving SH1 off of Vivian Street, and enable a second Mt Victoria Tunnel for more general traffic capacity. That of course was not the objective in the latter years of Let's Get Wellington Moving. 

Let's Get Wellington Moving Basin options

For what it's worth, I think the right solution is to enable what is depicted below from an early concept in LGWM to shift SH1 to the Karo Drive corridor in a trench to connect to a future proofed Basin Reserve grade separation.  

Long term option for cut and cover bypass across Te Aro

and no, tunnelling too deep on the north side of the Basin Reserve isn't an option. There is a stream already running under there and the geology is soft (it isn't called "Basin" for nothing, as the land was uplifted in the 1878 earthquake from what was then considered to be a possible location for docks). So the Basin Reserve either needs to be bypassed far away (Long Tunnel), be bridged over somehow (or with a shallow trench and lower bridge), or be left alone.  However, moving SH1 into a trench to its west, is not going to be worth doing until a solution is found for the Basin, and there is likely to need to be some engineering creativity involved in achieving that. Otherwise there would be a congested at grade intersection.

Maybe this sort of elegance is needed to make it acceptable? Bearing in mind it would need to be a two way bridge, be lower at the western end (as Sussex Street on a bridge over the end of it would make sense), and then assuming it isn't going to be light rail, there is space for bus rapid transit to go around the Basin in both directions to and from Adelaide Road (and the duplicated Mt Victoria Tunnel).

2008 indicative Basin Bridge concept from north

Mt Victoria Tunnel

East of the Basin Reserve the options become clearer.  In 2011, a range of options were considered, including tunnels either side of the existing one, and longer ones from Wellington Road at various points, and new bus tunnels.

Mt Victoria Tunnel duplication options considered 2016

The conclusion was clear:

and it was depicted as follows from Wellington Road to the Basin Reserve

Preferred Mt Victoria Tunnel, Ruahine St and Wellington Rd duplication concept 2017 before cancellation under LGWM

It seems likely that this is the most cost efficient option to proceed, as long as the decision on the Basin Reserve can address issues around visual impact and noise.

Funding and pricing

Tolls aren't likely to be much use for this option, not least because the key point of doing this project is to take traffic off of alternative routes.  Tolling the existing and a new Mt Victoria Tunnel (unlike the long tunnel) would likely see Newtown and the Evans Bay/Oriental Parade routes get filled. Unlike tolling more rural segments of highway, the costs of less traffic through the tolled routes are more likely to be born in higher externalities in built up areas.  

However, time-of-use pricing designed to shift demand during peak times entering the central city (to the east and north of SH1) could certainly be used, to reduce congestion entering Wellington city and free up capacity for traffic bypassing the city. It could also be used to help fund a bypass, as this is what happened in Oslo with implementation of its toll rings through Oslo Package 1.

The amenity value in removing perhaps half of the traffic from Vivian Street (and on what remains of a surface route were Karo Drive now is), and removing around a quarter of traffic off of the waterfront route would be considerable. As such, this whole project needs to be seen as much as an urban amenity and redevelopment project, as a road project. It would enable longer crossing times across the Quays and the Quays to be more oriented towards local access. It would help increase connections by bus, foot and cycling across this route to and from the city, and help to revitalise Te Aro with a significant reduction in traffic. Oslo saw this happen when it built a bypass tunnel under its central city.

Bear in mind the long tunnel would have speeded up travel from the airport to the motorway, but would not have had the same scale of impact on local amenity because it would not have served as much traffic as the more localised option across Te Aro.

What matters is cost, although clearly this all could be done in stages, unlike the long tunnel. This enables costs to be better managed, and for benefits to be realised much more quickly.  

 Mt Victoria Tunnel and the widening to the east could be done in one stage. Other stages include grade-separating the Basin Reserve, trenching across Te Aro and finally, a second Terrace Tunnel (which would be relatively easy to build, as all of the land is reserved and part of the approaches were built before being cancelled). 

It could all be done supported by time-of-use road pricing to manage demand and help support the funding of it, and the sequencing is important.  A second Mt Victoria Tunnel would make some difference, but without a Basin Reserve upgrade would see traffic backing up through the westbound tunnel from the Basin.  A second Terrace Tunnel without a trenched route across Te Aro would not achieve much beyond some shortening of queues.  The trenched route would be highly disruptive while being built, but without a Basin upgrade would see big queues eastbound. 

One thing seems likely, the long tunnel looks like it is a non-starter, but a second Mt Victoria Tunnel looks like it could proceed, more quickly than anything else at this stage. Wellington could do worse than proceed with those plans, which include an upgraded cycling and pedestrian route in the new tunnel, as a first step, while more time and money is spent working out how to take that traffic between there and the Terrace Tunnel.

Conclusion

The rational economic answer would be to introduce time-of-use road pricing for entering central Wellington and then seeing what the traffic looks like, but it seems highly unlikely that this could obtain the political and public support necessary to proceed. So a second best is to implement road pricing to help   pay for a project that has, as a fair proportion of its benefits, public amenity and development of the city by removing through traffic. To do that requires extra capacity at the Terrace Tunnel, Mt Victoria Tunnel and across Te Aro between them.

It would be a significant step forward not just for general traffic for both people and freight between the airport and the region, but also the hospital and eastern and southern suburbs, and the region, but for public transport, cycling and walking to and from the city, and for the development of Wellington as a destination.  The latter comes from it being not just easier to get to and from the airport, but by removing the blight of through traffic in Te Aro and making the waterfront a destination that is not severed by a primary arterial highway.

This should be the last Government Policy Statement on Land Transport Funding

Consultation has closed on the first draft Government Policy Statement (GPS) on land transport for the National led government issued by new Transport Minister, the Hon. Simeon Brown. It represents a significant change from the draft GPS published by the previous (Labour) government (PDF). 

It has four strategic priorities, compared to the draft produced by the previous government, which had six. 

The new draft GPS strategic priorities are:

• Economic growth and productivity;

• Increased maintenance and resilience;

• Safety; and 

• Value for money.

The previous draft had the following priorities:

• Maintaining and operating the system;

• Increasing resilience;

• Reducing emissions;

• Safety;

• Sustainable urban and regional development; and 

• Integrated freight system.

Three of these priorities are similar to the new one, but others are gone, with a focus on economic growth, productivity and value for money, over reducing emissions, and sustainable development.

Notable most of all is the return of the Roads of National Significance (RoNS) programme seen before with the Key Government, albeit some were also proposed by the Hipkins Government before the election under the title “Strategic Investment Programme”, including projects such as “Warkworth to Whangarei”, “Cambridge to Piarere”, “Tauranga to Tauriko”, “second Mt Victoria Tunnel” (albeit a different one to the one likely under RoNS) and “Ashburton Bridge”. Little of the critical commentary of the draft GPS has noted this point.

The new GPS has had support from some quarters, particularly in business and the road transport sector. National Road Carriers Group said “This policy is geared towards getting the basics right” and Business Canterbury said it is “a welcome first step in recognising roading infrastructure as being key to the performance of businesses”. 

However, it has seen vehement criticism from supporters of the previous government.  The Greater Auckland blog claimed it is the “most ideological, unbalanced and petty transport policy the country has seen” and Green transport spokesperson Julie Anne Genter said “Simeon Brown is obsessed with forcing people into their cars”. 

Of course, it is rather strange to use the term “ideological” as a pejorative when the GPS process is, by its very nature, ideological. Politics is ideological, and of course the values, priorities and objectives of the Green Party on transport policy are grounded in their own ideology, which is different from the ACT Party and National. 

The 2021 GPS, approved by then Transport Minister, Hon. Michael Wood, included an indicator in its targets of reducing VKT travelled, to achieve “transforming to a low carbon transport system”.  It is arguably an ideological choice that the best means to reduce emissions is to reduce total driving, rather than reduce consumption of fossil fuels (after all, electric vehicles powered by renewable energy emit no emissions).  “Road to Zero” is arguably ideological, by prioritising a public policy goal of zero road deaths, rather than zero deaths from accidents at home, or zero deaths due to medical misadventure, or zero deaths of children from domestic violence.  

The point is not to say “Road to Zero” is not a laudable goal, and a case can be made for it (although the cost to prevent the last road death is likely to far outstrip the cost of saving deaths in other sectors). Rather, it is naïve to think that a land transport funding system that is set up to implement political ideology and politically determined objectives is not ideological. It is ideological as to the extent to which money collected from motor vehicles is directed towards users of other transport modes. 

There was a conscious decision by the Clark Government, in its last term, to return NZ to a politically-led land transport funding system (after politics had largely been stripped out of it in 1996, having been significantly curtailed in 1989), and since then the Key and Ardern/Hipkins Governments maintained that system.

It is the nature of politics and the nature of a land transport funding system that is designed to be a three-yearly political football. That is fundamentally its weakness and is a key cause of some of the ills seen today in that funding system.

So I'm not going to review the draft GPS. It has some strengths (productivity is important), and there are some questions to be asked about parts of it (e.g., there are merits in providing appropriate capacity for walking and cycling as part of major highway projects on efficiency grounds, and the current wording leaves some ambiguity as to that), but it's not that important. What's really important is having a funding framework that isn't dependent on political/bureaucratic choices to ensure one of the country's most important utilities is well maintained and operating efficiently.

What’s wrong?

There is a Ph.D thesis that can be written as to the weaknesses of the current land transport funding system, but here are some of them:

• Poor incentives for cost-efficiencies, as savings in maintenance and operations are not seen as translating into additional funds for construction and upgrades, and politically driven projects are seen by contractors as “guaranteed” of funding regardless of price;

• Difficulties in securing long-term pipelines of construction projects, especially by geography and type of construction (e.g. bridges, tunnelling) as capital funding is tied to three-year NLTPs, based mostly on cashflow, ad-hoc Crown funding and political imperatives (which are fickle – see the Melling Interchange which was under development for many years, then deferred in 2019, then funded with Crown funding in 2020). This inflates their costs;

• Territorial authorities are limited in their capacity to finance and fund capital works on local roads, due to competing demands and the need to raise, on average 40-50% of the cost of such projects from rates (or borrowing supported by rates)

• Mixed and non-transparent relationship between rates charged by local government and the cost or benefits of local road or public transport funding supplied by such funding;

• Low use of debt to finance new capex, to spread the cost of major projects across future users, than cashflow from road users unable to use projects still under construction. This limits capacity for new capex, but also is arguably unfair from an intergenerational equity perspective, and means the opportunity cost of capital in new projects is not fully reflected in the cost of construction; 

• Ad-hoc, inconsistent and non-transparent measurement of performance and accountability to road users by road controlling authorities and largely dependent on political imperatives over issues as they get traction in media;

• Little link between the pricing of road use (through RUC/FED/MVR) and the delivery of road infrastructure, and next to no incentives to use more direct pricing either to fund new capital or to enable better use of the network;

• Little reflection of “willingness to pay” as a criteria for funding of activities;

• Ad-hoc and inconsistent co-ordination between road controlling authorities;

• Little input from road users on preferences regarding the construction and operations of roads, including trade-offs around maintenance, renewals, capacity, speeds, safety;

• Inefficiencies from having over 60 road controlling authorities contracting independently;

• Use of economic evaluation to rank and moderate spending is heavily compromised by political imperatives to make projects “stack up” (whether road, rail or public transport) leading to highly inconsistent benefit/cost appraisals;

• Poor incentives to commercialise the use of transport corridor land, whether roads or railway stations;

• Kiwirail’s main source of infrastructure funding (for maintaining most of its network outside Auckland and Wellington) is not its users but the state highway manager/land transport funder/regulator following decisions by Ministers;

• Lack of transparency and subsequent justification around cross-subsidies by users, modes or geography; and

• Limited and inconsistent post-project evaluation of the impacts of projects on reducing congestion, improving safety, achieving modal shift or reducing demand for emissions. 

What should the land transport funding system be doing?

This speech by Hon. Chris Bishop, Minister for Infrastructure, at the Infrastructure Funding & Financing Conference on 26 March in Wellington gives some good indications as to what the system should do.

In his view, there are five things that are needed to be done to close the infrastructure deficit:

1. First, we have to do a better job of maintaining existing assets. That means funding both the up-front cost and ongoing maintenance of infrastructure over the life of the asset.

2. Second, we need a credible pipeline of infrastructure projects to attract the capital and talent we need to get building.

3. Third, we need to reduce barriers that are holding back infrastructure delivery and growth. RMA reforms are already underway to get nationally and regionally significant projects fast-tracked.

4. Fourth, we must improve value for money. Reducing the cost for each metre roads or rail will help close the deficit, improve resilience, and lift productivity.

5. Fifth and finally we need new ways to fund and finance infrastructure. Investment must be financially sustainable, which means each asset can wash its own face over its economic life, directly or indirectly, rather than depend on generous cross-subsidies.

Setting aside the third point (which is about planning law), the GPS process has proven to be far from satisfactory in addressing the first, second, fourth and fifth points. Indeed, this shouldn’t be a surprise, because a system that almost entirely ignores what users want, which determines supply based predominantly on political determined priorities and which is dependent on cashflow for most capital spending, not debt, is not going to be well set up to maintain and develop infrastructure on a sustainable or efficient basis. In recent years the main way the land transport funding framework has “found” new ways to fund infrastructure, is having the Minister of Finance approve new Crown funded “funds” for specific groups of projects. The previous Government’s draft GPS listed 21 separate sources of Crown funding for its NLTP, albeit it was looking to cull that down to 14 for 2025/2026 and 10 for the following year. Even politically driven NLTF funding has seen the rise of direct politically determined Crown funding, but done none in a co-ordinated, strategic way, but in ad-hoc reaction to events. That is not a sustainable basis to operate an entire economic sector (which is what road infrastructure is).

This is why the Government should take the opportunity to reform the land transport funding and governance system. For failing to do so will risk a turnaround in priorities again, whether after a change in Minister or more importantly, a change in Government, adds cost to road controlling authorities, public transport authorities, contractors, but most importantly road users and taxpayers, as unnecessary costs are imposed on the system due to uncertainty and ad-hoc decision making, and a lack of clear accountability for delivery of the levels of service that users should expect.

What about other networks?

Electricity, gas, telecommunications, airport and port infrastructure get maintained without the Ministers of Energy, Communications or Transport proclaiming objectives for the funds those sectors raise from their users. Indeed, the idea that somehow the money collected from your electricity, gas, mobile phone or broadband bills should be distributed by what a Minister decides, maybe or maybe not following official advice, smacks of another age or quite simply, a planned economy. Some (such as natural monopolies like Transpower, local lines companies and Chorus) are subject to regulatory oversight, others (such as ports and airports) are more driven by market imperatives. Users with regulatory oversight, drive maintenance in infrastructure sectors almost entirely funded by fees charged to users.

Capital spending is long-term, because the infrastructure suppliers develop long-term plans, based on forecast demand, looking at depreciation profiles of major assets, assessing risk around resilience, and using debt for renewals, supported by long term funding from user fees. Again, it is not up to the whims of Ministers, it is not capital spending by cashflow, and projects don’t appear and disappear because of perceived political benefit, or ideological bias in favour or against certain major projects. There is regulatory oversight, for example when airport companies seek to develop terminals and expect their customers (airlines) to pay for it. 

Value for money is delivered by having infrastructure providers that are required to operate commercially, generate a return from capital and pay dividends/reinvest net profits in their networks. 

They obtain funding and financing from user fees almost exclusively.  This sets up a tight, direct relationship between users and providers, and means users drive what is built, and how the utilities operate. There is some of this now in the land transport sector, but the dominant relationship is for service providers to respond to bureaucratic and political imperatives, not user imperatives. Far too often user imperatives get filtered through politicians, which is neither efficient nor fair, especially on users too busy or not sufficiently well organised or connected to get heard.

So what should happen?

Land transport funding needs to be reformed, and the basics that everyone seems to say they agree with, should be placed outside the political cycle, as they are for so much of the infrastructure sector. The good news is that land transport is better managed and funded than water, overall, because there is some direct user charging across the country, which provides a steady source of revenue. There are some standards applied and some disciplines on spending. 

So how should the objectives set out by Bishop be implemented?

Here are a few headlines:

• Directly hypothecate most maintenance and renewal funding to road controlling authorities, under specific conditions.  The first call on fees collected from road users should always be to maintain and renew the current network. This should be outside politics.

• Enable road controlling authorities to borrow for major projects using forecast cashflow from RUC/FED, and possible toll revenue (and where relevant, revenue from property owners that capture value from specific projects). 

• Require road controlling authorities to develop corridor and capital investment plans over ten years specifically to meet the needs of their users, informed by what users want. Such plans should reflect forecast revenues, with plans beyond that timeframe included so that no-regrets preparatory measures (purchase of land, projects that are complementary) can be undertaken.

• Move state highway management into a separate state-owned enterprise, out of NZTA, to manage and operate the network as a professional organisation, which also manages standards for the entire road network, and is expected to operate as a business for its customers.

• Return revenue from track user charges to Kiwirail Infrastructure directly (take it out of the NLTP), and more transparently separate infrastructure and operating businesses. Subject track user charge rate setting to economic regulatory oversight, and render transparent any Crown subsidies to the maintenance, renewal and upgrades to the Kiwirail network. End NLTP funding of Kiwirail outside that needed for PT infrastructure projects.

• Review the funding and structures around local road controlling authorities to make them more transparent, more accountable to road users and property owners dependent on them for access, and to enable them to borrow against revenue streams, and to encourage efficient consolidation of local road controlling authorities for economies of scale and capacity to undertake large scale projects. The role of rates (a largely non-transparent and blunt instrument) should be reviewed.

• Concentrate NLTP funding on public transport and active modes to operations and capital that improve the productivity of the land transport network and significantly reduce negative externalities. Funding of public transport for primarily social or public health purposes should come from Crown funding, rather than from other users of the network.

• Review the funding and structures around public transport regulation and contracting to make the more accountable to users and property owners that benefit from the provision of such services.  Review the ownership models for major public transport infrastructure, in particular the incentives for development around corridors and stations.

What would be the Minister’s role?

Under a future funding framework the Minister would still have a role around the setting of fees for nationally collected road user fees, such as RUC/FED/MVR and in approving tolling (and congestion pricing) schemes.  The Minister would also scrutinise the performance of Kiwirail (along with the Finance Minister, but the Transport Minister would care about outcomes for users, not just rate of return on capital), the State Highway Manager and the remaining functions of NZTA around regulation and funding.  The Minister could also seek and obtain Cabinet funding for major projects beyond the capacity of the NLTF to fund (and also for Kiwirail), so that there would still be scope to go beyond that which is collected from road users, but the Minister could not raid the NLTF for special projects (whether a motorway or a rail project),or take away maintenance funding. Indeed the NLTF would be largely ring-fenced as significant parts of it would be dedicated to ten-year maintenance and capital programmes, with much capital borrowed and needing servicing over future years.

Further steps in reform, especially if all vehicles are on RUC, and some RUC is collected electronically with reference to location, then road controlling authorities could set their own regulated rates for using the roads and be guaranteed that funding with appropriate regulatory oversight.  Never again would maintenance and renewals be underfunded, and capital spending would be within the capacity of road users’ willingness to pay, topped up by political decisions to add Crown funding on top of that. A government heavily interested in road spending could choose either to enable more increases in RUC or add Crown funding for specific projects. A government uninterested in road spending could not cut spending below what was needed for maintenance, renewals, a steady level of spending on small to medium sized projects, and already committed large projects funded from user fees (but it could cut Crown funding completely). This would give a lot of certainty to the sector, with flexibility only existing where additional funding competes with other sectors.  

Furthermore, it would mean that, like most of the economy, the provision of a key service (roads) would be linked to the demand for it by users and their willingness to pay. Those that maintain and operate them would be incentivised to do so efficiently, and in a way that is optimal to their customers, and what people pay for them reflects the cost of providing them, and just perhaps it would see the erosion of a culture that means that, by and large, the sector looks after itself.  It would be nice for the system to not be subject to perpetual culture wars by those who think the system should exist to reflect not what people want, but what some planners and politicians think is what they should have.

Crucial next steps for Auckland congestion pricing

I usually write about road pricing in my Road Pricing Blog, but I have placed this article here primarily because it is a wider transport policy issue around governance, and isn't just about road pricing in Auckland.

The announcement of the removal of the Auckland Regional Fuel Tax (ARFT) by the (NZ) Minister of Transport, Hon. Simeon Brown is implementation of an election promise, and is not a surprise.  The big question is what comes next, and talk of congestion pricing, given it is also part of the National/ACT party coalition agreement, is clearly something that needs to be progressed this year.  However, there are some big questions that need to be addressed.

Don’t miss the regional fuel tax

The ARFT was introduced, with the intention that it operate for a ten-year period in 2018 to enable Auckland Council to fund transport projects in the region. It had been criticised at the time for its distributional impacts, with a study by Sapere Research Group in 2018 (PDF) regarding both the ARFT and national increases in Fuel Excise Duty (FED) concluding that they will:

• give rise to significant variation across households in terms of impacts;

• be regressive in nature- (i.e. disproportionately impact on lower-income households);

• likely impact inequitably on Māori households, especially in the south of Auckland;

• produce even more inequitable impacts when fuel efficiency of vehicles is considered.

In short, the ARFT unfairly burdens those least able to afford it, not least because they are least likely to be able to afford newer vehicles (such as EVs or hybrid vehicles) that are more fuel efficient, less likely to be able to afford to live near the public transport that connects them to their employment and more likely to work shifts or at times when alternatives to driving are less feasible or attractive. 

Removal of the ARFT is notable as it is rare, anywhere in the world, to see a Government willing a scrap a tax on road use. It raises the issue as to how to pay for significant improvements to Auckland’s transport network beyond the capacity of the National Land Transport Fund (NLTF) which has its own issues of funding capacity to meet government objectives (highlighted in the NZTA Briefing to the Incoming Minister) and the political willingness of Auckland Council to increase rates.

When the previous Government held a Select Committee Inquiry into Congestion Pricing, many suggested that congestion pricing in Auckland could be used to replace the ARFT.  

Congestion pricing can’t replace the ARFT revenue in its entirety for some time

Congestion pricing clearly could generate some net revenues for transport in Auckland, but it is important to emphasise that while it can do that, for it to be effective in managing congestion, the net revenues need to be seen as secondary and not the primary objective. Designing congestion pricing to reduce congestion will mean it is designed to deliver net benefits to transport sector users, regardless of revenues generated and how they are spent.  This is how it has worked in Singapore and Stockholm, but it is not what has happened in London (certainly in the past decade or so) nor Gothenburg.

If it is to be assumed that the Government wants congestion pricing to be about reducing congestion and improving trip reliability in Auckland, it needs to be designed and implemented with that as the primary focus. If Auckland Council and Auckland Transport regard congestion pricing primarily as a tool to make up the revenue lost from not having the ARFT, it is at best going to be sub-optimal in addressing congestion at the times and locations where it is introduced, and at worst will deliver insufficient travel time savings for motorists resulting in a backlash against the concept, killing off congestion pricing in Auckland (and NZ) for many years to come.

The Congestion Question report, albeit now slightly dated (as the analysis was undertaken before the pandemic), indicated the likely net revenues from the short-listed congestion pricing options.  The most promising option was the “Combination” which would see introduction of a city-centre cordon scheme, along with pricing the strategic road network (motorways and parallel main arterials).  

The city-centre cordon was estimated to generate around $21m per annum in net revenues, which is far short of the around $150m per annum generated from the ARFT, so simply operating that scheme would do little for revenue, but of course it wasn’t designed to generate revenue, but to support reducing congestion entering, exiting and circulating within the city-centre.

Table 1 - The Congestion Question: Main Findings July 2020

The strategic corridor option was estimated to generate around $205m per annum, and assuming it would be introduced in combination with the city-centre cordon, there would be a combined net revenues of $223m per annum (the effect of one scheme would be to suppress some demand that would otherwise occur if only the other scheme was in operation).

The strategic corridor option cannot be implemented in full in one go.  The suggestion of pricing SH16 between Lincoln Rd and Te Atatu Rd, and SH1 between Greenlane and Ellerslie/Panmure is a feasible first step towards doing so, so it might be expected that the strategic corridor option is phased in over several years. Although these figures come from 2019, it is reasonable to take a conservative approach, as travel patterns in Auckland have changed somewhat since the pandemic. 

In short it means that the ARFT revenue cannot be quickly replaced through congestion pricing, assuming that congestion pricing is implemented with the objective to improve network performance as a primary goal, rather than revenue raising.

Key decisions

What matters now is how congestion pricing in Auckland is advanced.  There are some big decisions to be made on governance, rate setting and use of net revenues. These will have a significant impact on the likely success of pricing and importantly, public acceptability and durability of pricing as a policy. A key element is how much decision-making will be up to road controlling authorities and how much will be up to central government either politically or administratively, from which there are some big governance issues:

1. How will legislation enable congestion pricing? 

Will it be general empowerment, case-by-case scheme approval or something else?

Existing legislation around tolling essentially requires Cabinet approval on a case-by-case basis following recommendation by the Minister. This is suitable for toll roads, which are specific sections of road with rates set to contribute towards infrastructure cost, and so are unlikely to need to be varied much, except to take into account inflation. For congestion pricing, there is a need to have some variability and flexibility in implemention.  Detailed Orders-in-Council specifying precisely where pricing points are, their hours of operation and price levels are unlikely to be suitable for effective congestion pricing.

An inner-city cordon may need some minor variations in the location of pricing points, and both the hours of operation and rates set will need to vary to manage demand effectively (and avoid pricing traffic during times of low demand).  Pricing, after all, works best in all sectors when it is flexible. History tells us that when prices are heavily regulated for goods and services, especially when pricing is intended to send signals around demand and supply, that it distorts usage, whether by underpricing demand (which is the status quo) or in overpricing (and reducing economic activity in an area).

However, caution should be exercised in simply providing general empowerment for road controlling authorities to implement pricing under certain conditions. International experience indicates that congestion pricing is very difficult to implement, primarily because it is easy to quickly undermine public confidence in the concept and the details of any scheme, resulting in overwhelming resistance and pressure to cancel. This has been seen in several occasions, notably Edinburgh, Manchester, the Netherlands (multiple occasions), Helsinki, Copenhagen and London (with removal of the Western Extension of the congestion charge). 

This is not to say that Auckland Transport, Wellington City Council, Christchurch City Council and Tauranga City Council couldn’t implement congestion pricing, or indeed NZTA, but it’s also worth remembering that when congestion pricing fails, it tends to kill the idea politically for many years. Edinburgh rejected congestion charging in 2005 after five years of development, and is only now again looking at the concept. Manchester rejected it in 2008, after considerable design work over the previous two years, and has no interest in reconsidering it.  Although many trump London as a success, the London Congestion Charge was expanded once and that expansion was rolled back three years later in 2010, and even today there is only talk of more congestion charging for the city (don’t mistake the Ultra Low Emission Zone, for which 97% of vehicles are exempt from paying, for congestion charging).  Local authorities are subject to the political whims of elections every three years, and given the timeframes needed to implement pricing, there is considerable risk that pricing could become a serious political issue if not managed effectively.  Bear in mind no NZ local authority has implemented road pricing before, and only Tauranga implemented tolls (albeit some years ago).  There are a long list of implementation risks that if not managed well could undermine congestion pricing not just in the first city that tries it, but in all others. 

Note also that despite the UK having had legislation generally empowering local authorities to implement congestion charging, only one outside London has actually done so: Durham. The Durham scheme was introduced before London’s and is in effect a small charge on driving in the tiny historic centre of the city.  Empowerment of local government to introduce congestion charging in the UK has largely failed, as none have had the political courage to do it, and of those that tried, they have proven incapable of developing and communicating a pricing scheme that would obtain adequate public acceptability. Indeed, the repeated failures of Edinburgh and Manchester to implement pricing has almost inoculated most councils to implementing it. Most recently it is Cambridge that has attempted to introduce pricing and, in no small part to the design it chose, it has repeated the examples of the other cities in generating enormous opposition to congestion charging for that city. 

Although it is possible to conceive of congestion pricing concepts for Auckland and other cities that do not charge the state highways, excluding them from any scheme is likely to be sub-optimal in managing traffic in those cities. Both Auckland and Wellington could have a “first-stage” pricing scheme implemented in the form of inner city cordons without pricing of the state highways, but the “second-stage” would inevitably need to include them. It is also critical that any road pricing scheme not negatively impact the state highways. In all cities congestion pricing is likely to be more effectively managed if undertaken jointly between NZTA as the State Highway manager and the relevant territorial authority managing the local network. 

For example, in Auckland, this means ensuring SH16 to the Ports of Auckland functions well. Of course if the first scheme in Auckland is actually to price segments of SH16 and SH1 as the Mayor of Auckland proposed late last year, then it is inevitable that it be undertaken jointly, as Auckland Transport does not (and should not) have the powers to price roads it does not manage.

The first congestion pricing scheme in NZ is likely to be in Auckland, so it is critical that it is designed to be effective without being punitive. It needs to have sufficient flexibility as it is introduced to make small adaptations quickly if motorists respond in unexpected ways which cause issues (such as congestion on alternative routes. There should be measurement of performance, in impacting travel times, trip reliability, net revenue collection and compliance, as well as wider economic, social and environmental impacts. London undertook such analysis for its first five years of operation. This is critical in building data on how to expand and adapt pricing and to mitigate any negative impacts.

It is far too risky to simply leave all of this up to a single Council without the necessary experience, particularly if its incentives are more around revenue collection than traffic management.

Auckland congestion pricing should be a joint NZTA/AT project. The Auckland Traffic Operations Centre is, for logical reasons, and this should follow on from that. It doesn’t matter if the first scheme in Auckland is a city-centre cordon or a strategic corridor, as the second scheme will be the other. NZTA is already expanding and renewing its tolling back-office system, which could provide the platform to deliver congestion pricing, although it will need to have a significant uplift in capacity for customer service.  

2. How is rate setting to be undertaken, and reviewed and updated over time? Is there going to be regulatory oversight to it?

To be effective in managing congestion, congestion pricing in NZ should follow the Singapore approach of setting prices to ensure a minimum throughput of average speed on priced roads, with the ability to review and revise (up or downwards) such prices on a regular basis. Singapore does it quarterly, with no regard at all as to whether it impacts net revenues positively or negatively. A similar approach would ensure traffic impacts are optimised, and public acceptability is as well. Having shoulder as well as peak rates, so that the price is not simply $0 at 0630 then $5 at 0700 will be important to avoid bunching of traffic before pricing kicks in, and to spread demand. This is not practicable if rate setting is done by Cabinet, so this needs to be devolved to a governance entity which is empowered to vary rates (with perhaps a cap applied), with some regulatory oversight over time.  In due course, multiple pricing systems in different cities ought to have an economic regulator ensuring that road controlling authorities are looking after the interests of consumers both in the prices they set and how they spend the money. 

3. Who decides what net revenues are used for?

In the UK, legislation determines that net revenues from congestion charging are used on local transport spending. In Sweden, central government decides in partnership with local government how net revenues will be used, and in Stockholm it was initially focused on funding a major highway project, and has since included funding for public transport projects. Oslo similarly has used revenue from its toll ring (which resembles a congestion pricing scheme although it is primarily designed for revenue) for various blends of road and public transport projects, but again, this was determined by central government in collaboration with local government.

If revenue is being raised from state highways, it may seem appropriate for NZTA to decide, following guidance from the Government Policy Statement. If raised from local roads, it may seem appropriate for the territorial authority to decide, albeit it would seem difficult to get public acceptability for pricing if such revenue were used for non-transport purposes or on projects or activities unrelated to those subject to pricing. There are clearly a wide range of options on how net revenues might be used such as supporting spending on capital projects or offsetting rates revenue for spending on local capital projects or local road maintenance or public transport subsidies. A more innovative solution would be to pay a dividend to Auckland householders from congestion pricing, but this seems unlikely given the pressure from the Auckland Council and Mayor to find sources of revenue to spend on transport projects (and the Government is also interested in funding some of those projects as well).

What comes first though is who makes that decision. Compared to many other issues related to road pricing, relatively little thought has been given to this.

One chance to get it right

There are other issues of a secondary nature. Clearly the question as to what the first road pricing scheme in Auckland should look like is critical, but before that there are decisions on governance that are needed that haven’t been adequately canvassed, because they are difficult and controversial.  However they are needed soon, because until they are determined, progress cannot be made on detailed design, procurement and implementation of any congestion pricing in Auckland or elsewhere. It is possible for Auckland to be ground-breaking for NZ and indeed for many other cities with high-levels of private car use relative to other modes. However it is also possible for this to go badly wrong. For the last twenty of so years politicians have erred on fearing the latter, now NZ is on the cusp of making the last crucial step, they should address the remaining key issues and advance, bringing Aucklanders, and especially Auckland motorists with them. This Government has shown, by removing the ARFT, that it doesn’t see motorists as the enemy, it has the chance to show this further by implementing pricing in a way that, overall, delivers net benefits to them, and as a result net benefits to those who ride buses, bicycles and walk, and the businesses and communities they work and live in.

Many write about the successes in congestion pricing, few write or even know about the failures. Plenty of cities have advanced studies and developed proposals, and had the legal mandate to implement them, but pulled the ideas because of public backlash, largely due to key elements having either not been decided or having been designed in a way that doesn't deliver net benefits to those who pay. Auckland should not be on the list of failures.