Farewell Let's Get Wellington Moving

The announcement today that the new National/ACT/NZ First Government has reached agreement with the Mayor of Wellington and Chair of the Greater Wellington Regional Council on terminating the Let's Get Wellington Moving (LGWM) programme is going to be welcomed by most people in Wellington, with perhaps the exception of those working on the programme.

It had increasingly looked to the public like an expensive exercise with very little delivery, primarily reflecting its emphasis being less on addressing the transport policy issues most Wellingtonians sought to have addressed, such as congestion, public transport reliability and road maintenance backlogs, but rather a focus on reductions in emissions and supporting expensive projects to encourage private investment in housing on a strip of the southern corridor.  Bear in mind the total cost, to taxpayers and ratepayers, was estimated at $7.4b over 30 years. That was an extraordinary level of funding, but the primary reason for culling the programme was not about cost, but about objectives and delivery. One would have to have been well removed from much of the Wellington public to think that LGWM was not seen by most as being somewhat of a bad joke, for better or for worse. That wasn't the fault of those who did good work on the programme, but it was the fault of the Ministers who oversaw it and encouraged it to lose focus, and didn't take the public along with them.

Original purpose was lost

LGWM had its genesis under the previous (Key/English) National Government, originating from the bringing together of the Ngauranga-Wellington Airport Corridor programme for State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Public Transport Spine Study for Wellington.  It sought to bring together an integrated programme for transport in the city, based on addressing the issues around both (the state highway and public transport (PT))  key corridors.

For SH1 it mainly came out of the failed attempts to fix the Basin Reserve with the Basin Bridge, which would have linked Mt. Victoria Tunnel to the Arras Tunnel, and addressed much of the congestion at that site. It failed because of Mt. Victoria NIMBYism combined with the remainder of the Green Party led opposition to the Wellington Inner City Bypass (in its various forms). Some simply didn't want a solution to the problem, which is the need to grade-separate traffic in both directions at a busy and iconic location.

The Public Transport Spine Study (PDF full report) concluded that Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) was the preferred modal option and that the Golden Mile should be the primary public transport corridor. It recommended that implementation of BRT coincide with the necessary improvements to SH1, being specifically grade-separation at the Basin Reserve and a duplicate Mt. Victoria Tunnel and 4-laning to Cobham Drive. Indeed that study indicated that compared with simple bus priority or light rail, the highest benefit/cost ratio would come from BRT. 

LGWM emerged from all of that, and reopened the analysis and arguments, and was predicated on developing an integrated approach to improving PT through the city and SH1, and was changed radically following the 2017 General Election, under the influence of the Labour led coalition government with the Greens and NZ First. The significant influence of the Greens in this reprioritising of outcomes was instrumental in refocusing LGWM away from transport network outcomes, towards wider environmental and city shaping outcomes. 

The objectives reflected significant influence from then Associate Minister of Transport, Julie Anne Genter by prioritising emissions reduction and mode shift, followed by "enhancing urban amenity" and "enabling urban development outcomes" (more housing).

Let's Get Wellington post 2018 objectives

Efficient and reliable transport outcomes (which arguably are what many Wellingtonians sought) had the second-equal lowest weighting. Reducing carbon (not noxious) emissions as the top priority could not be achieved without a concurrent reduction in ETS units.. Arguably the goal of increasing mode shift (separate from the net impacts of this) is a focus on an input, not an output. The effect of this is to encourage policies to make car travel less convenient, slower and more expensive.  Mode shift is good if it reduces costs for users and taxpayers (financial and travel time) and/or reduces negative externalities (emissions, congestion), more than it increases costs. However, it was treated as a positive end in itself by LGWM.  In most cases, users are best placed to know what mode is best for the trip they undertake (or for goods they ship), LGWM was by design heavily weighted towards a more centrally planned approach to how people move.  This is what has been rejected by the new government.

Even safety had a relatively low weighting, which may be a surprise to some given the emphasis on safety oriented projects (e.g. Cobham Drive pedestrian crossing). However Wellington City, compared to other parts of the country is relatively safe in terms of fatal and serious-injury crashes, so that seemed appropriate, although there was a strong emphasis on improving perceptions of safety for cyclists in particular.

In short, LGWM became mostly a project about the environment and about encouraging housing (in a small part of Wellington), and not so much about improving mobility, let alone "Wellington moving". 

The effect of this reorientation was that it was no longer an objective to relieve congestion on SH1 (or other corridors) for general traffic. Relieving congestion would benefit car traffic, and cars were to be discouraged, and so their trips had to be slower and less competitive, relative to other modes.  Freight, including deliveries and commercial traffic was not important, as it was assumed that making driving harder and other modes easier would see modal shift, and the roads would be "freed up" for what were seen as legitimate uses of the network.  In any case, mobility of freight was not an objective.

Nowhere else in the world has such modal shift by enhancing other modes, relieved congestion without road pricing, and work on advancing congestion pricing in Wellington was stopped under previous Minister Phil Twyford, and little progress was made subsequently. 

State Highway 1 would have remained congested

Proposed work on SH1 was limited to a second Mt Victoria Tunnel to replace, not add to, the existing Mt Victoria Tunnel. The existing Mt Victoria Tunnel was to be converted to a cycling/walking tunnel (which while nice was overkill for the purpose), and the new tunnel would still have two-lanes for general traffic and two new bus lanes.  The new tunnel would be expensive given its proposed width, and it would mean no improvement to congestion for general traffic (but would have been an improvement to bus priority).

LGWM second Mt Victoria Tunnel proposal

The Basin Reserve upgrade was focused on enhancing PT between Kent/Cambridge Tce and Adelaide Rd.

LGWM Basin Reserve proposal

The Basin Reserve upgrade proposal was to continue constraining capacity to one lane each way from the Hospital/Southern Suburbs to SH1, but it has more significant shortcomings:

1. It makes no provision for shifting SH1 south/east bound from Vivian St to a duplicated Arras Tunnel which would need to be grade-separated at Kent Terrace/Dufferin St to efficiently use the capacity from a duplicated Mt Victoria Tunnel. Wellington won't have an efficient bypass long term without a grade-separated bypass from the Terrace Tunnel to Mt Victoria Tunnel. Of course the LGWM objectives would mean reducing congestion on this corridor is not a key objective.
2. West/northbound SH1 traffic would have the same number of traffic light controlled intersections as it does at present - the difference is the phases would be shorter and the route shorter.
3. Traffic from Kent Terrace to Adelaide Road would have to travel WEST along part of Vivian Street to then turn left towards an extended Sussex St, further constraining the eastbound Vivian/Kent/Cambridge Tce intersection.  This would slow general traffic further.

Compared to the original emphasis of the Ngauranga-Wellington Airport Corridor Programme, there would remain major shortcomings. The Terrace Tunnel would remain a major bottleneck, particularly southbound.  Vivian Street in particular, but also Karo Drive would remain highly congested corridors for much of the day, and SH1 would continue to bifurcate Te Aro, with major intersections carrying high volumes of SH traffic, including heavy vehicles, at Willis, Victoria, Cuba, Taranaki and (eastbound only) Tory Streets, but also along Kent Terrace. LGWM would do nothing to fix the blight of what was meant to only be a "medium term" bypass, across Te Aro.

Finally, the Basin Reserve may have worked more efficiently for PT to and from the southern and eastern suburbs, but general traffic would still have suffered considerable congestion. The new Mt Victoria Tunnel would queue back to Vivian Street and beyond, and traffic from Adelaide Rd to and from Cambridge/Kent Terrace would see low to nil travel time savings.  

Whether or not the Cobham Drive pedestrian crossing was a good idea or not is moot, but it was telling that a programme that should have been about strategic level transport improvements for Wellington, was delivering minor projects that had little impact at low cost. If the crossing had merit, NZTA should have included it within the NLTP as a state highway project. It should not have been part of LGWM, even if it was thought to contribute to its outcomes.  The contrast with ATAP - the Auckland Transport Alignment Project - which brought central and local government focus on strategic transport funding together, was notable. Where LGWM ended and responsibility at WCC, NZTA and GWRC levels started was becoming blurred.

Gold plated PT without net benefits

By far the most significant element of PT for LGWM was light rail between the Railway Station and Island Bay.  This project offered no net economic benefits in transport economic terms and was dependent on heroic assumptions of intensification of land use to get a BCR of greater than 1.0.  The spine study was damning of light rail from an economic point of view.

In short, a single tram line, with bespoke infrastructure (electricity supply, catenary and tracks) has such an enormous capital cost (and the CO2 produced in building it), it simply isn't worth it at a NPV cost of $2.4b.  Although light rail would be on its own corridor from Courtenay Place to Rintoul Street, south of there it would be travelling with general traffic, and be no faster than buses are today.  Furthermore, light rail is not faster than buses at grade, and although it can be higher capacity, it is not worth the higher marginal capacity.  Bus priority with potential for BRT would deliver nearly the same capacity, with more flexibility because buses on multiple routes can use bus lanes or BRT corridors, providing better PT for a wider range of locations and users. 

Quite simple, for $2.4b all of Wellington could get effective bus priority where it addresses bottlenecks and capacity problems, and more likely for less.  Furthermore, it seemed unlikely Wellington would have a single light rail line in itself.  Was LGWM seriously suggesting a single line be all that is built in 30 years, or would it extend to Karori or Miramar as well?  Bus priority or BRT would support much more of the city having enhanced PT, with greater frequency and improved travel times. It is difficult to see how spending the same money on a single light rail route would achieve better net outcomes.

Beyond the light rail line is the question of improving PT priority through the city matters, but the Golden Mile project has been criticised for doing relatively little to improve bus service, because of the reduction in bus stops and the lack of locations for buses to pass one another.  However, that project as a whole has wider criticism around cost and impacts.

What is Wellington?

A wider critique was that LGWM was not about Wellington as a whole, which is true.  LGWM offered next to nothing for the region and would make little difference to improving travel from the region to major regional facilities such as Wellington Airport and Wellington Hospital.  As much as some may think otherwise, few travel by train then bus from Upper Hutt or Kapiti to the Hospital or Airport.

However, even in Wellington City as a whole, LGWM had limited presence. Its work on Ngauranga Gorge emphasised walking and cycling, which while it has a role, is not ever going to be the key modes of travel from the Northern Suburbs to the city and beyond.  Karori and the Western Suburbs have had little focus, when the Karori Tunnel is an obvious and ongoing bottleneck, not just for general traffic but buses and for cycling.  

What about the "new deal"?

The key components of "post-LGWM" deserve some scrutiny:

• Central Government will fund and build a 2nd Mt Victoria Tunnel and Basin Reserve upgrade
• Golden Mile upgrade will be delivered by WCC, which will need to improve cost efficiencies, "better bus routes", pedestrian access and closer engagement with local business
• Accelerate bus priority along North-South, East-West and Harbour Quay corridors
• Begin conversations on a city/region deal.

The second Mt Victoria Tunnel should be a parallel tunnel to the existing one (with cycling/walking facilities) enabling two lanes in each direction, along with 4-laning Ruahine St and Wellington Rd. It has to be built with grade-separation of the Basin Reserve, but it should not be the LGWM proposal.  

NZTA should review the Basin Reserve options quickly, and consider what options would best work by being future-proofed for a cut and cover bypass from the Basin Reserve to the Terrace Tunnel. That bypass need not be built yet, but it will be absolutely essential if there are proposals to take a lane each way off of the waterfront route.  It would also be important in providing a reliable route around the city if congestion pricing is to be introduced.  In short, the Basin Reserve is going to need SH1 going under and/or over Sussex and Dufferin Streets, whether by going deeper (which has significant geological issues) or by building an artificial hill to the north of the Basin Reserve under which a tunnel and bridge are placed through it and over Kent Terrace/Dufferin Street).  

NZTA should be planning for a second Terrace Tunnel and a cut-and-cover Te Aro Bypass after the Basin Reserve upgrade.

The Golden Mile upgrade ought to be staged, starting with Courtenay Place, and should proceed on the basis of it improving both mobility through the city and enhancing businesses in the CBD. If it makes sense to retain some car parking and more general traffic access, it should enable it. The improvements should be performance based, but what matters the most is that it should be cost effective and have net benefits to the city.  

Enhancing bus corridors should be welcome, but it should also be performance based. It should deliver net benefits across all network users. The Harbour Quay corridor (which simply doesn't exist yet) is a surprise, as it is only needed once the Golden Mile route reaches capacity, but more importantly it cannot be implemented without significantly reducing traffic along that route (by around 20-30%). 

To do that would require some combination of congestion pricing and fixing SH1 between the motorway and Mt Victoria Tunnel to take through traffic off of the waterfront. That means a second Terrace Tunnel, as well as a second Mt Victoria Tunnel and a grade-separated cut-and-cover Te Aro bypass.  To implement such a bus corridor along the waterfront before fixing that route, would reduce access between the region and the airport/hospital.

More widely, the latest version of LGWM bus priority was less focused on benefit/cost than on identifying locations where bus priority could be implemented.  It should be first focused on addressing bottlenecks for buses on congested routes and then on what is needed to improve capacity meaningfully.  

What should happen now?

With LGWM winding down, NZTA should develop a corridor strategy for SH1 through Wellington, which includes but is not limited to the Mt Victoria Tunnel and Basin Reserve. It should also, in consultation with WCC, develop an approach for congestion pricing for Wellington, albeit the timing of this should not be in advance of completion of the Mt Victoria Tunnel and Basin Reserve upgrades as a bare minimum. 

GWRC with WCC and NZTA should develop a bus priority strategy within the year, and WCC should rescope the Golden Mile improvements to be sequenced and to trial traffic changes before implementing the landscaping/amenity works that accompany them, to ensure impacts on buses and businesses are positive.

Longer term it is worth considering whether governance for transport across the region should be revisited.  Funding for improvements should be based on delivering net benefits for users, major corridors in Wellington that are NOT state highways should have strategies to address congestion and safety issues, and to enable more capacity that may be needed for more housing. This is particularly relevant towards the northern and western suburbs.

So it is farewell to LGWM. A lot of analysis has been done, much of it will be valuable in the coming years, but the programme as a whole won't be missed by most.  The biggest mistakes for the programme were in politicians letting its scope grow and changing its objectives, so it no longer was focused on what it was meant to achieve originally.  That loss of focus was what went wrong.  There was insufficient discipline on cost vs. benefit, and the growth of scope and change of objectives saw delivery lost, except on minor projects of little consequence.

That, as a whole, should be the lesson to government more generally about control on scope and objectives.